INTRODUCTION
The notions of self-interested behavior, decentralized decision making, and incentive-compatibility are basic and key concepts in studying various economic systems or organizations. However, most investigations have been concerned with analyzing the performance of an economic organization or institution only under the restriction of private ownership. Until recently, for the general equilibrium approach to the efficiency of resource allocation of private goods, the most commonly used general equilibrium notion was the Walrasian equilibrium principle which is a general equilibrium concept for private-ownership institutions. Since the Walrasian mechanism, in general, is not incentive-compatible even for classical economic environments when the number of agents is finite, many incentive mechanisms have been proposed to implement Walrasian allocations at Nash equilibrium and/or strong Nash equilibrium points such as those in Hurwicz (1979) , Schmeidler (1980) , Hurwicz et al. (1995) , Postlewaite and Wettstein (1989) , Tian (1989 Tian ( , 1992 Tian ( , 1996 , Hong (1995) , and Peleg (1996a Peleg ( , 1996b among others.
The Walrasian equilibrium principle, however, has a limited scope. It must take profit shares as exogenously given and, further, no publicly owned firms are allowed in the economy under consideration. In their paper, Roemer and Silvestre (1993) introduced the notion of the proportional solution for general convex economies with both private and public ownership with endogenous profit distributions. 1 The notion of the proportional solution has desired properties in that it yields Pareto efficient allocations. It is also a generalization of Walrasian equilibrium to the case of an economy with public as well as private endowments, in the sense that, if there are no public endowments, the solution is the conventional Walrasian solution, but when there are public endowments, it is equivalent to the Walrasian solution with endogenous profit shares distributed among consumers in proportion to their purchase of public sector commodities. Thus the solution concept gives an endogenous theory of profit distribution for economies with coexistence of privately and publicly owned firms. However, like the Walrasian mechanism, the proportional solution mechanism is not incentive-compatible either. As Roemer and Silvestre indicate in their paper, they do not consider the issues of asymmetric information and incentive compatibility of the solution concept.
In this paper we attempt to fill this gap. We will deal with the problem of the incentive mechanism design which results in Pareto efficient allocations for mixed ownership economies. We do so by investigating the incentive aspect of the proportional solution for general convex economies. We allow not only preferences and individual endowments but also coalition patterns among individuals to be unknown to the planner. We will propose a mechanism which doubly implements the proportional solution. That 1 For pure public goods economies, some solution concepts have also been proposed in the literature as solution concepts for public/state ownership, including the ratio equilibrium notion of Kaneko (1977) and the generalized ratio equilibrium notion of Tian and Li (1994) , as well as the more general solution notions of the various cost share equilibria of Mas-Colell and Silvestre (1989) . A version of the proportional solution for public goods economies actually coincides, under some conditions, with the notion of balanced linear cost share equilibrium presented in Mas-Colell and Silvestre (1989) .
is, we will give mechanisms in which not only Nash allocations but also strong Nash allocations coincide with proportional allocations. By double implementation, the solution can cover the situation where agents in some coalitions will cooperate and in some other coalitions will not. Thus, the designer does not need to know which coalitions are permissible and, consequently, the possibility is allowed for agents to manipulate coalition patterns.
Note that the mechanisms proposed in the paper also have some nice properties in that they use feasible and continuous outcome functions, and further, have message spaces of finite dimension. In addition, our double implementation result is very general. We allow any number of private sector commodities and public sector commodities, any number of firms and individuals, and coexistence of privately and publicly owned firms with general convex production possibility sets. Furthermore, our mechanisms work not only for three or more agents, but also for two-agent economies, and thus they are unified mechanisms which are irrespective of the number of agents. Although Suh (1995) and Yoshihara (1999) considered double implementation of the proportional solution, they only considered a very special case of economic environments with only one private sector commodity and one public sector commodity, no privately owned firms, and one publicly owned firm. In addition, the mechanisms they constructed are not continuous. Furthermore, the method they used to construct the mechanisms is quite different from the one we adopt. Also, they need to assume that the production function is differentiable, while we allow for general production possibility sets.
It may also be remarked that, because of the endogenous profit distributions which depend on both prices and quantities at equilibrium, and the double implementation requirement, as well as the generality of economic environments under consideration, the implementation problem of the proportional solution is much harder than the one for the conventional Walrasian solution; and the mechanisms to be constructed are quite different from the existing ones. As such, some of the techniques used in implementing other market-like equilibrium solutions such as Walrasian equilibrium for private goods economies or Lindahl equilibrium for public goods economies may not be applicable, and thus some new techniques are needed.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 sets forth a general mixed ownership model and gives the notion of a proportional solution, and provides notation and definitions used for mechanism design. Section 3 gives a mechanism which has the desirable properties mentioned above when preferences, individual endowments, and coalition patterns are unknown to the designer, but production possibility sets are known. We then prove that this mechanism doubly implements the proportional solution. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 4.
THE MODEL

Economic Environments
We consider a mixed ownership economy in which there are n 2 consumers, F privately owned firms, one publicly owned firm, and H commodities which are partitioned into two groups denoted by ρ and µ.
2 There are L private sector commodities in group ρ and K public sector commodities in group µ (thus L + K = H). Throughout this paper subscripts are used to index consumers or firms, and superscripts are used to index goods unless otherwise stated. Denote by N = 1 2 n the set of consumers, x ρ the consumption of private sector goods which are either initially owned by individuals or produced by privately owned firms, and x µ the consumption of public sector goods which are either initially owned or produced by a publicly owned firm. Production technologies of privately owned firms and of the publicly owned firm are given by 1 f F and C , respectively. Here "C" is for "collectively owned." We assume that, for g = 1 F C, g is nonempty, closed, convex, and 0 ∈ g . Note that, since privately owned firms only produce goods in group ρ and the publicly owned firm only produces goods in group µ, we have implicitly assumed that y 4 Thus, we have n i=1 w i + w C > 0. For detailed discussions on the setting of the economic environment, see Roemer and Silvestre (1993) . m. 3 R i is convex if, for bundles a and b, a P i b implies λa + 1 − λ b P i b for all 0 < λ 1. 4 Here we just follow Roemer and Silvestre (1993) An economy is the full vector e = e 1 e n 1 F C and the set of all such economies is denoted by E.
An allocation of the economy e is a vector x 1 x n y 1 y F y C ∈ H n+F+1 such that: (1) x = x 1 x n ∈ nH + , and (2) y g ∈ g for g = 1 F C. Denote y P = y 1 y F ("P" for privately owned firms), and y = y P y C .
An allocation x y is feasible if
Denote the aggregate endowment, consumption, and production byŵ =
Then the feasibility condition can be notationly written aŝ
by noting thatŵ µ = 0 andŵ ρ C = 0. An allocation x y is Pareto optimal with respect to the preference profile R = R 1 R n if it is feasible and there is no other feasible allocation x y such that x i P i x i for all i ∈ N.
Proportional Solution
To define the proportional solution, let us first define the efficiency prices for Pareto optimal allocations.
The nonzero vector p * ∈ H + is a vector of efficiency prices for a Pareto optimal allocation x * y *
Given a price vector p = p ρ p µ and an allocation x y P y C , a proportional share θ iC is defined by
Note that θ iC 0 since −y µ f 0, and n i=1 θ iC = 1. An allocation x * y * is a proportional solution for an economy e ∈ E if:
(ii) there exists a vector of efficiency prices p * for x * y * such that
Denote by PR e the set of all such proportional allocations. Note that with L = 1, K = 1, no privately owned firm, and p * ρ being normalized to one, Eq. (5) becomes is the ratio of i's consumption of public sector output to the total output of the public sector. Roemer and Silvestre (1993) gave two alternative interpretations. One is that the proportional solution can be viewed as "efficiency with payment according to average cost" (i.e., payment equals average cost), and the other is that "efficiency without Marxian exploitation" (i.e., labor spent equals labor embodied (when regarding the private good input as labor)). Suh (1995) and Yoshihara (1999) considered the double implementation of the proportional solution for the simple case specified by (6). Roemer and Silvestre (1993) proved the existence of a proportional solution for the general setting of the model, and they also proved that an allocation x * y * is a proportional solution if and only if it is a Walrasian 6 When Roemer and Silvestre (1993) defined the proportional shares as well as the proportional solution, they introduced the notation of net outputs and inputs of the public sector t + and t − which may make the expressions of the proportional shares and proportional solution less intuitive. Here we give an explicit expression of these notions which are equivalent to the those defined by Roemer and Silvestre (1993) by noting thatx −ŵ −ŷ P = y C + w C , w allocation with endogenous profit shares for publicly owned sector production, i.e., if and only if it is a Walrasian allocation when profit shares from firm C are given by (4). This equivalence relationship will display an essential rule in our implementation results. We state it here as a lemma. 
We will use this fact for the remainder of the paper. From the budget equation specified in condition (2), one can see that profits made by the publicly owned firm are distributed among consumers according to θ * iC which is defined by (4), i.e., in proportion to the difference between consumers' consumption and privately owned firms' production input demand for public sector commodities. In this paper, we consider double implementation of proportional allocations by designing feasible and continuous mechanisms which doubly implement the above Walrasian allocations with the endogenous profit shares θ * iC . To do so, we need make the following indispensable assumption. A message m * = m m * n ∈ M is said to be a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism M h for an economy e if, for all i ∈ N and m i ∈ M i ,
7 ∂D denotes the boundary of the set D.
where
n . h m * is then called a Nash (equilibrium) allocation of the mechanism for the economy e. Denote by V M h e the set of all such Nash equilibria and by N M h e the set of all such Nash (equilibrium) allocations.
A mechanism M h is said to Nash-implement the proportional solution on E, if, for all e ∈ E, N M h e = PR e .
A coalition S is a non-empty subset of N.
A message m * = m * 1 m * n ∈ M is said to be a strong Nash equilibrium of the mechanism M h for an economy e if there does not exist any coalition S and m S ∈ i∈S M i such that for all i ∈ S,
* is then called a strong Nash (equilibrium) allocation of the mechanism for the economy e. Denote by SV M h e the set of all such strong Nash equilibria and by SN M h e the set of all such strong Nash (equilibrium) allocations.
A mechanism M h is said to doubly implement the proportional solution on E, if, for all e ∈ E, SN M h e = N M h e = PR e .
A mechanism M h is said to be
A mechanism M h is said to be continuous if the outcome function h is continuous on M.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPORTIONAL SOLUTION
The Description of the Mechanism
In the following we will present a feasible and continuous mechanism which doubly implements proportional allocations in Nash and strong Nash equilibria when preferences, endowments, and patterns of cooperations are unknown to the designer. It is well known by now that, to have feasible implementation, the designer has to know some information about individual endowments. That is, we have to require that an agent cannot overstate his own endowment although he can understate his own endowment. This requirement is necessary to guarantee the feasibility even at disequilibrium points. The intuition here is straightforward: if a mechanism allows agents to overstate their endowments, then it allows for unfeasible outcomes-it will sometimes attempt to allocate more than is possible, given the true aggregate endowment. Note that, when goods are physical goods, this requirement can be guaranteed by asking agents to exhibit their reported endowments to the designer. Since w C is publicly owned, we assume that w C is known to the designer.
The message space of the mechanism is defined as follows. For each i ∈ N, let the message domain of agent i be of the form
t iF t iC γ i η i whose components have the following interpretations. The component v i denotes a profession of agent i's endowment, and the inequality 0 < v i w ρ i means that the agent cannot overstate his own endowment; on the other hand, the endowment can be understated, but the claimed endowment v i must be positive. The component p i is the price vector proposed by agent i and is used as a price vector of agent i − 1, where i − 1 is read to be n when i = 1. The component z i = z i 1 z in is consumption proposed by agent i in which z ij is j's consumption level of goods proposed by agent i. The component y i = y i1 y iF y iC is i's proposed production plan of all firms, in which y ig , g = 1 F C, is firm g's production plan proposed by i. The component t i = t i1 t iF t iC is i's reported points in production possibility sets of all firms, in which t ig is agent i's reported point in the gth production possibility set. The component γ i is a shrinking index of agent i used to shrink the consumption of other agents. The component η i is the penalty index of agent i for avoiding some undesirable Nash equilibria.
Remark 2. It may be remarked that the dimension of the message space can be reduced in a number of ways. First, it will be seen that, by the construction of the proportional share function, each individual i's proportional share of profit from the publicly owned firm is determined only by his neighbor i + 1. It is not necessary for the mechanism designer to require each individual to announce goods consumptions for all other individuals. We define our mechanism as it is to keep exploration simple. Second, each individual only needs to announce L − 1 goods consumption in group ρ since the remaining one can be determined by the budget constraint, and thus the message space can be reduced by n. Third, when privately owned firms do not use public sector goods to produce private sector goods (i.e., y µ f = 0 for all f = 1 F), the proportional share becomes θ iC = p µ · x µ i / p µ ·x µ , and thus the reporting t i1 t iF t iC becomes unnecessary. Therefore, the message can be deducted by nH F + 1 . These remarks will become clear after we define the outcome function.
Remark 3. There are three reasons we require each individual i to announce a proposed production plan y i which may not be in production possibility sets and a production plan t i in . First, we want the mechanism to have the property that agent i can reach any production plan within the feasible production set B y m defined below. At the same time, the component y µ f in his proportional share is determined by a feasible production plan in B y m . Finally, y * i is in B y m * when m * is a Nash equilibrium so that Y m * is a relative interior point of B y m * on . As a result, the proportional shares have a form determined by Eq. (4) at Nash equilibrium (see Lemma 12 below).
Before we formally define the outcome function of the mechanism, we give a brief description and explain why the mechanism works. For each announced message m ∈ M, the designer first assigns a price function vector p i m to each individual i, in a way that is determined by the price vector announced by his neighbor, agent i + 1. With this determined price function vector p i m , the proportional share function of agent i is determined by Eq. (4), but evaluated by z µ i+1 i and t µ i+1 f , which are proposed by agent i + 1. Thus, each individual takes his price vector and proportional shares as given and cannot change them by changing his own messages. We then define three feasible constrained choice sets. First, define the feasible constrained production set B y m by which goods can be produced with total resources available in the society. The outcome of production plan Y m is chosen from B y m so that it is the closest to the average of the proposed production plans of firms by all agents. Then, to determine the preliminary outcome of consumption for agent i, construct two constrained budget sets B µ i m and B ρ i m for public sector goods consumption and private sector goods consumption, respectively. First, determine the preliminary outcome for public sector goods consumption x µ i m such that it is the closest to his own proposed public sector goods consumption, z µ ii . Then definex ρ i m as the closest point to his own proposed private sector goods consumption, z ρ ii . To give an incentive for all agents to announce the same price vector and consumption vector, as well as give an incentive for each agent to announce y i and t i as close as possible at equilibrium, the preliminary outcome for private sector goods consumption is determined by the product ofx ρ i and a penalty multiplier (see Eq. (21) below). To obtain the feasible outcome consumption X m , we need to shrink the preliminary outcome consumption x i m in some way that will be specified below. We will show that a mechanism constructed in such a way will have the properties we desire. In addition, at equilibrium, all consumers maximize their preferences, all firms maximize their profits, all individuals take the prices of goods as given, and individuals' proportional shares are determined by Eq. (4). Thus the mechanism doubly implements the proportional solution.
Now we formally present the outcome function of the mechanism.
where n + 1 is to be read as 1. Note that although p i · is a function of the proposed price vector announced by agent i + 1 only (so that every individual takes the prices of goods as given), for simplicity, we can write p · as a function of m without loss of generality. Define agent i's (endogenous) proportional share function θ iC M → ++ by
which is continuous because
f is positive and p i · is continuous. Note that, by the construction of p iC · , θ iC · is independent of m i so that no individual can change his profit share by changing his messages.
To determine the level of production for each g, define the feasible production correspondence B y : M → 2 F+1 H by
which is clearly nonempty compact convex (by the closedness and convexity of g as well as total resources constraints) for all m ∈ M. We will show the following lemma in the Appendix.
Lemma 2. B y · is continuous on M.
y ig which is the average of the proposed production plans of firms,ỹ P = ỹ 1 ỹ 2 ỹ F , andỹ = ỹ P ỹ C . Define the outcome function for production plan
which is the closest point toỹ. Here · is the Euclidian norm. Then, by Berge's Maximum Theorem (see Berge (1963, p.116 )), we know that Y m is an upper semicontinuous correspondence. Also, since B y m is closed and convex valued, it is also single-valued (see Mas-Colell (1985, p. 28) 
and the profit share function of agent i from privately owned firms by
and the total profit share of agent i from both privately and publicly owned firms
which are all continuous.
To determine the level of consumption for each individual i, we first define the µ-feasible consumption correspondence B
which is a correspondence with non-empty compact convex values. We will prove the following lemma in the Appendix. 
which is the closest point to z ii . Then, by the same reasoning, x µ i m is single-valued and continuous on M.
We then define the ρ-feasible consumption correspondence
for all m ∈ M. ii for all i ∈ N. We need these properties to determine the profit shares of agents from the publicly owned firm. This will become clear when we prove the implementation results.
Remark 5. Note that our mechanism works not only for three or more agents, but also for a two-agent world. While most existing mechanisms which implement market-type social choice correspondences (such as Walrasian, Lindahl, Ratio, or LCSE allocations) need to distinguish the case of two agents from that of three or more agents, this paper gives a unified mechanism which is irrespective of the number of agents.
Remark 6. If there are no publicly owned firms, i.e., µ = 0, the mixed ownership economies reduce to private ownership economies, and the part of the mechanism for public sector goods becomes unnecessary. The simplified mechanism is therefore a new mechanism which doubly implements the Walrasian solution in private ownership economies.
Implementation Result
The remainder of this section is devoted to proving the following theorem. then the above-defined mechanism, which is continuous and feasible, doubly implements proportional allocations in Nash and strong Nash equilibria on E when preferences, endowments, and patterns of cooperation are unknown to the designer. Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 consists of the following three propositions which show the equivalence among Nash allocations, strong Nash allocations, and proportional allocations. Proposition 1 below proves that every Nash allocation is a proportional allocation. Proposition 2 below proves that every proportional allocation is a Nash allocation. Proposition 3 below proves that every Nash equilibrium allocation is a strong Nash equilibrium allocation.
To show these propositions, we first prove the following lemmas.
8 Condition 2 can be weakened so that i∈N w i + w C > 0 if individual endowments w i are known to the designer. Proof. Since X m
Then, by convexity of preferences, we have x λi P i X i m * for any 0 < λ < 1. Also 
n , and thus
Proof. We first prove Y m * is a relative interior point in B y m * on . Indeed, since y * ig = t * ig ∈ g for all g = 1 F C by Lemma 7 and X m * > 0 by Lemma 6, we haveŶ m * + for all i ∈ N. Therefore, we have Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is some g and a production plan y g ∈ g such that p m * · Y g m * < p m * · y g . Let y gλ = λy g + 1 − λ Y g m * with 0 < λ < 1. Then p m * · Y g m * < p m * · y gλ , and y gλ ∈ g by the convexity of g . Also, since Proof. Let m * be a Nash equilibrium. We need to prove that X m * Y m * is a proportional solution with p m * as a price vector. By Lemma 1, we only need to show that it is a Walrasian allocation with endogenous profit shares determined by (4). Note that, by construction, the mechanism is feasible, and by Lemmas 2-10, Y g m * maximizes the profit of firm g for g = 1 F C, p m
So we only need to show that each individual is maximizing his/her preferences subject to his/her budget constraint.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is some
by Lemma 6, there is some m i ∈ M i such that X i m i m * Proof. We first note that x * ∈ H ++ by interiority of preferences. Also, by the strict monotonicity of preference orderings, the normalized price vector p * must be in
++ . We need to show that there is a message m * such that x * y * is a Nash equilibrium allocation. For each i ∈ N, define 
X i m * is the maximal consumption in the budget set of i, and thus S cannot improve upon X m * Y m * . Q.E.D. Since every strong Nash equilibrium is clearly a Nash equilibrium, by combining Propositions 1-3, we know that SN M h e = N M h e = PR e for all e ∈ E and thus the proof of Theorem 1 is completed. Q.E.D.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have considered the incentive aspect of the proportional solution for general mixed ownership economies which allow any number of private sector commodities and public sector commodities, any number of firms and individuals, and the coexistence of privately and publicly owned firms with general convex production possibility sets. We presented market-type mechanisms which doubly implement the proportional allocations when coalition patterns, preferences, and endowments are unknown to the designer. Two important reasons for preferring double implementation over Nash (social) implementation and strong Nash (social) implementation are: (1) The double implementation covers the case where agents in some coalitions may cooperate and in other coalitions may not, when such information is unknown to the designer. (2) This combining solution concept, which characterizes agents' strategic behavior, may bring about a state which takes advantage of both Nash (social) equilibrium and strong Nash (social) equilibrium, so that it may be easy to reach and hard to leave. The mechanisms constructed in the paper are well-behaved in the sense that they are feasible and continuous. In addition, unlike most mechanisms proposed in the literature, it gives a unified mechanism which is irrespective of the number of agents.
We now end the paper by mentioning some limitations of the paper. First, unlike the mechanisms proposed by Tian (1992) and Hong (1995) , which Nash implement the Walrasian correspondence, the mechanism constructed in the paper does not meet the so-called non-wastefulness and best response properties which require that all resulting allocations be balanced (but not merely weakly balanced) and that each participant have a best response for every strategy profile of the other participants even for nonequilibrium messages (Jackson et al., 1994) . The requirements of double implementation and the endogenous profit distributions make the case of the proportional solution more difficult than that of the Walrasian in constructing a feasible and continuous mechanism which meets the above properties. Whether or not there exists a non-wastefulness and best response mechanism which doubly implements the proportional allocations in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium is a hard question and remains to be solved.
Second, this paper assumes that all agents have complete information about economic environments. Similar to Bayesian implementation of rational expectations Walrasian or Lindahl equilibria studied by Wettstein (1990) and Tian (1996) , one may consider (double) implementation of proportional allocations in Bayesian equilibrium (and strong Bayesian equilibrium) by using some of the techniques developed in this paper.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 2. B y m has closed graph by the closedness of g (j = 1 F C) and the continuity of outcome functions. Since the range space of the correspondence B y · is bounded by the resource constraint, it is compact. Thus, B y · is upper hemi-continuous on M. We only need to show that B y m is also lower hemi-continuous at every m ∈ M. Let m ∈ M, y ∈ B y m , and let m k be a sequence such that m k → m, where m k = m 1 k m n k and m i k = v i k p i k z i k y i k t i k γ i k η i k . We want to prove that there is a sequence y k such that y k → y, and, for all k larger than a certain integer, y k ∈ B y m k , i.e., y g k ∈ g for g = 1 F C,v k +ŷ
0. We first prove that there is a sequence y 1 k such that y 1 k → y, and, for all k larger than a certain integer,
. Two cases will be considered.
Then, for all k larger than a certain integer k , we havev k +ŷ 
Let λ k = min l∈ λ l k , and let y 1 k = λ k y. Then y 1 k → y. Since g is convex and 0 ∈ g as well as y g ∈ g , we have y 1g k ∈ g for all g = 1 F C and all k. Also, for every good l in group ρ, if l ∈ , we havev l k +ŷ Therefore, for k max k k , we havev k +ŷ
0. Now we show that there is a sequence y 2 k such that y 2 k → y, and, for all k larger than a certain integer, y 2 k ∈ g for g = 1 F C, and
by the continuity of outcome functions. Let y 2 k = y for all k > k and y 2 k = 0 for k k . Then, y 2 k → y, and, for all k, y 2g k ∈ g for g = 1 F C, and 
Then, for all i ∈ N , 0 α i k 1 and α i k → 1. Let α k = min i∈N α i k , and let y 2 k = α k y. Then y 2 k → y, and by the convexity of g , y 2g k ∈ g for all g = 1 F C and all k. Now we claim that y 2 k also satisfies
for all k larger than a certain integer k by the continuity of outcome functions and by y 2 k → y. Thus, for all k max k k and all i ∈ N, we have shown that
Finally, let y k = min y 1 k y 2 k . Then y k → y since y 1 k → y and y 2 k → y. Also, when k is sufficiently larger than a certain integer, y g k ∈ g by noting that y 1g k ∈ g and y 2g k ∈ g for g = 1
, by the same arguments as above, one can show thatv k +ŷ
0. Thus, y k ∈ B y m k for all k sufficiently larger than a certain integer. Therefore, the sequence y k has all the desired properties. So B y m is lower hemi-continuous at every m ∈ M. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma
